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Abstract
A proof of quantumness is a method for provably demonstrating (to a classical verifier) that a quan-
tum device can perform computational tasks that a classical device with comparable resources cannot.
Providing a proof of quantumness is the first step towards constructing a useful quantum computer.
There are currently three approaches for exhibiting proofs of quantumness: (i) Inverting a classically-
hard one-way function (e.g. using Shor’s algorithm). This seems technologically out of reach. (ii)
Sampling from a classically-hard-to-sample distribution (e.g. BosonSampling). This may be within reach
of near-term experiments, but for all such tasks known verification requires exponential time. (iii)
Interactive protocols based on cryptographic assumptions. The use of a trapdoor scheme allows for
efficient verification, and implementation seems to require much less resources than (i), yet still more
than (ii).
In this work we propose a significant simplification to approach (iii) by employing the random oracle
heuristic. (We note that we do not apply the Fiat-Shamir paradigm.)
We give a two-message (challenge-response) proof of quantumness based on any trapdoor claw-free
function. In contrast to earlier proposals we do not need an adaptive hard-core bit property. This
allows the use of smaller security parameters and more diverse computational assumptions (such as Ring
Learning with Errors), significantly reducing the quantum computational effort required for a successful
demonstration.
1 Introduction
Quantum computing holds a promise of a qualitative leap in our ability to perform important computational
tasks. These tasks include simulation of chemical and physical systems at the quantum level, generating true
randomness, algorithmic tasks such as factoring large numbers, and more. However, constructing a quantum
computer with capabilities beyond those of existing classical computers is technologically challenging. Indeed,
whether it is possible or not remains to be proven; such a “proof” is the focus of the ongoing race to construct
a useful quantum device, with records for device size and functionality set at an increasing rate by the likes
of Google, IBM, and the increasing number of startups heavily invested in this race. This notion, known as
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“proof of quantumness”,1 is generally viewed as a major milestone towards unlocking the powers of quantum
computing. We can classify existing approaches towards proof of quantumness into three families:
1. There are tasks that are generally believed to be classically intractable, and for which quantum algo-
rithms are known; most notably the factoring and discrete logarithm problems [Sho94]. Constructing
a quantum computer that can factor beyond our classical capabilities would constitute a valid proof
of quantumness. Alas, in order to implement the factoring algorithm on relevant input sizes one re-
quires fault-tolerant quantum computation, which seems technologically out of reach (see e.g. [GE19]
for recent and highly optimized estimates ranging in the millions of qubits).
2. A different approach, introduced independently by Bremner, Josza and Shepperd [BJS10] and by
Aaronson and Arkhipov [AA11], is to use a quantum device to sample from distributions that are
presumed to be hard to sample from classically. The intractability of classically achieving the task
has not stood the same test of time as more established problems such as e.g. factoring, but can
nonetheless be based on reasonable complexity-theoretic conjectures, at least for the problem of exact
sampling. While quantum devices that can sample from these distributions appear to be “right around
the corner”, the real challenges are in (i) showing hardness of approximate sampling — the quantum
device will never be perfect — and (ii) the classical verification: verification for these methods generally
requires investing exponential classical computational resources, and can thus only be performed for
fairly small input lengths.
3. A new approach was recently proposed in [BCM+18]. They propose to use post-quantum cryptography,
namely to rely on cryptographic assumptions that cannot be broken even by the quantum device.
Rather than verifying that the quantum device has the ability to break the assumption, cryptography
is used to compel the device to generate a quantum superposition in a way that can be efficiently
verified using a secret key. This method is inherently interactive, unlike the previous two, and requires
at least four rounds of communication. As a cryptographic building block it uses trapdoor claw-free
function families (recall that claw-freeness was originally introduced in the context of digital signatures
and constructed based on factoring [GMR85]). In addition to claw freeness, the [BCM+18] approach
also requires an additional adaptive hardcore bit property which appears to be hard to realize and is
currently only known to be achievable based on the Learning with Errors (LWE) assumption [Reg05].
The third approach is compelling in its ability to verify quantumness even of large quantum devices
efficiently, but it still requires a large number of quantum operations. Furthermore, the interactive nature
of the protocol requires the quantum device to retain a superposition while waiting for the verifier’s second
message (a single random bit).
In this work we simplify the [BCM+18] approach and allow for it to be based on a more diverse set of
computational assumptions. This marks a step towards a protocol that can be realistically implemented on
an actual quantum device, and can be efficiently verified on a classical computer.
Our Results. We propose to use the random oracle heuristic as a tool to reduce the round complexity
of the proof of quantumness protocol from [BCM+18], making it into a simple one-round message-response
protocol. We note that it is unlikely that a similar result can be achieved in the standard model without
introducing an additional hardness assumption. The reason is that a single-round message-response protocol
in the standard model (i.e. without oracles) immediately implies that quantum samplers cannot be efficiently
de-quantized (otherwise the protocol will have no soundness). Such a result therefore implies a (weak)
separation between the BQP and BPP models. However, the LWE assumption does not appear to imply
such a separation, and the current state of the art suggests that it is equally intractable in the quantum and
classical settings.2
We show that using the random oracle heuristic, it is possible to implement the protocol in a single
round while at the same time eliminating the need for an adaptive hard-core bit property, and thus relying
1The term “quantum supremacy” is also used in the literature.
2This insight is due to a discussion with Omer Paneth.
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on any family of claw-free functions. In particular, we propose a construction of trapdoor claw free functions
which is analogous to that of [BCM+18] but relies on the Ring-LWE assumption [LPR10, LPR13]. Ring-
LWE based primitives are often regarded as more efficient than their LWE-based counterparts since they
involve arithmetic over polynomial rings, which can be done more efficiently than over arbitrary linear
spaces. Despite the similarity between LWE and Ring-LWE, proving an adaptive hard-core theorem for
the latter appears to be a challenging task. This is since the LWE-based construction uses a so-called
lossiness argument that is not known to be replicable in the Ring-LWE setting. We note that we can also
instantiate our method using “pre-quantum” cryptography since soundness should hold only with respect
to classical adversaries. Using a back-of-the-envelope calculation we estimate that it is possible to execute
our protocol using superpositions over ∼ 8λ log2 λ qubits, for security parameter λ and the adversary would
have advantage negligible in λ.
While we allow the use of trapdoor claw-free families based on arbitrary assumptions, which should allow
for better security/efficiency trade-offs, our protocol still requires the quantum device to evaluate the random
oracle on a quantum superposition, which could potentially create an additional burden. We point out that
current and future heuristic instantiations of the random oracle model using explicit hash functions are
assumed to enjoy efficient quantum implementation. Specifically, in evaluating the post-quantum security
level of cryptographic constructions (e.g. for the NIST competition [NIS]), security is evaluated in the
Quantum Random Oracle model where adversaries are assumed to evaluate hash functions on superpositions
as efficiently as they do classically. Granted, this is just a model for an adversary, but it is customary to
try to be as realistic as possible and not over-estimate the power of the adversary. We therefore consider
the evaluation of the random hash function as a relatively lower-order addition to the cost of performing the
quantumness test.
Lastly, we compare our method to the most straightforward way to employ a random oracle for the
purpose of round reduction, the Fiat-Shamir transform [FS86]. The basic protocol of [BCM+18] contains
4 messages, where the third message is simply a random bit. One can therefore do parallel repetition of
the protocol (though the soundness of this transformation needs to be shown),3 and apply Fiat-Shamir to
compress it into challenge-response form. Furthermore, for proofs of quantumness soundness is only required
to hold against a classical adversary, so the standard security reduction for Fiat-Shamir should hold. This
approach only requires to apply the random oracle to a classical input. However, it still requires the adaptive
hard-core bit property and is therefore restricted to the LWE assumption. We believe that our protocol,
being of a somewhat modified form compared to prior works, may be useful for future applications.
Our Technique. At a high level, a family of trapdoor claw free functions allows to sample a function
f : {0, 1} × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n together with a trapdoor. The function has two branches f(0, ·), f(1, ·)
which are both injective, i.e. permutations (this is a simplified description, actual protocols use a relaxed
“noisy” notion). It is guaranteed that it is computationally intractable to find a collision (“claw”) x0, x1
s.t. f(0, x0) = f(1, x1), however given the trapdoor it is possible to find for all y the preimages x0, x1 s.t.
f(0, x0) = f(1, x1) = y.
The [BCM+18] protocol sends a description of f to the quantum device, asks it to apply f on a uniform
superposition of inputs and measure the image register, call the value obtained y. The quantum device is
then left with a uniform superposition over the two preimages of y: (0, x0) and (1, x1). The value y is sent to
the verifier who challenges the quantum device to measure the remaining superposition on inputs in either
the standard or Hadamard basis. A classical adversary that can answer each query independently must also
be able to answer both at the same time, which is ruled out by the adaptive hard core property.
We propose to enable the quantum device to generate a superposition over (0, x0, H(0, x0)) and (1, x1, H(1, x1)),
where H is a one-bit hash function modeled as a random oracle. This can be done in a straightforward man-
ner, similar to the previous method. The device is then asked to measure the resulting state in the Hadamard
basis (always), and send the outcomes obtained to the verifier.4 Since the device makes a single measurement,
3Very recently, two concurrent works by Alagic et al. [ACGH19] and Chia et al. [CCY19] showed that parallel repetition of
Mahadev’s protocol indeed achieves negligible soundness error.
4In fact we use a slight variant of this protocol, since measuring the H part in Hadamard basis has probability 1/2 of erasing
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there is no need for a challenge from the verifier, which effectively collapses the protocol to two messages. A
quick calculation shows that the verifier receives a bit m and vector d s.t. in the case of a honest behavior
the equation m = d · (x0 ⊕ x1)⊕H(0, x0)⊕H(1, x1) holds. Finally, the verifier uses the trapdoor to recover
x0, x1 from y and checks that the equation is satisfied. The crux of the security proof is that a classical
adversary cannot query the oracle at both (0, x0) and (1, x1), otherwise it would have been able to find a
claw and break the cryptographic assumption. Therefore at least one value out of H(0, x0) and H(1, x1)
remains random, and thus the adversary cannot compute m, d that adhere to the required equation with
probability greater than 1/2. The proof thus follows from a simple extraction-style argument. In our main
protocol, we use parallel repetition to argue that no prover can succeed with non-negligible probability.
Discussion on the ‘Random Oracle’ Heuristic As discussed above, the Fiat-Shamir heuristic can be
used for the quantum supremacy protocol of Brakerski et al. [BCM+18]. However, this would mean that the
resulting scheme would require stronger assumptions (in particular, it would require noisy TCFs with the
adaptive hardcore bit property). Secondly, starting with the work of Canetti et al. [CGH04], many works
have shown uninstantiability of the random oracle. These works show certain cryptographic primitives which
are secure in the random oracle model, but are broken when instantiated by any concrete hash function.
However, these constructions are very contrived, and in particular, do not apply to our protocol.
Efficiency of our Protocol, and Comparison to Previous Approaches We would like to emphasize
that at the current level of maturity of quantum technology, any estimate of ‘practical advantage’ would
be educated guesswork at best. The technology for any option is far from being available and it is hard
to predict the direction that technology will take, and as a consequence the practical cost of implementing
certain operations.
This state of affairs, we believe, highlights the importance of developing multiple approaches to tasks such
as proof of quantumness. This way, an assortment of solutions will be ready to accommodate the different
directions that technology may lead.
A second point that we wish to highlight before getting into technical calculations, is that our approach
allows to use any family of trapdoor claw free permutations (and as we point out, for proofs of quantumness
even ‘pre-quantum’ candidates will suffice, e.g. if a candidate can be devised based on DDH in EC groups).
This means that our back of the envelope calculation only refers to one specific way of using our scheme.
Currently, we do not know any candidates for trapdoor claw free permutations based on such ‘pre-quantum’
assumptions.
Our protocol can be executed using a quasi-linear number of qubits and, with the proper choice of
candidate for the hash function, has quasi-linear computational complexity.
Comparison with [BCM+18] : Since we do not require the hardcore bit property, our input dimension n
is smaller by a factor of at least 60 log(λ). This follows due to Lemma 4.2 in [BCM+18]. Also, note that
the parameter q must also grow, hence the overall number of qubits required to implement the protocol
in [BCM+18] is O(λ log3(λ)), at least 100 log(λ) times more. Secondly, since [BCM+18] is a four-round
protocol, the prover must maintain its quantum state until it receives a challenge from the verifier.
Comparison to discrete log via Shor’s algorithm: Let n denote the number of bits required for representing
the group elements. The current estimates for the number of qubits required for discrete log are 3n, while the
number of quantum gates required is 0.3n3 (see [GE19]). Similar to Shor’s algorithm for factoring/discrete
log, our protocol is also a non-interactive one (that is, the verifier sends a challenge, and the prover responds
with an answer).
Open Problems. Our work suggests a number of open problems in the context of utilizing random oracles
in the regime of classical verification of quantum computation. Most desirably, whether it is possible to use
the random oracle in order to eliminate the need for other assumptions, or at least the need for a trapdoor.
Obtaining a publicly verifiable protocol is a highly desirable goal. We can also wonder whether our protocol
the information on that bit. Instead we append the H values directly to the phase. This is immaterial for the purpose of this
exposition.
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can be used for the purposes of certifying randomness or verifying quantum computation. In the plain model,
the adaptation of the proof of quantumness for these purposes was far from trivial and yet the protocol itself
is almost identical. Improving the state of the art in certifying randomness and in verifiability using random
oracles (or using other methods) is also an interesting open problem.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notations
For an integer n we write [n] for the set {1, . . . , n}. For any finite set X , let x ← X denote a uniformly
random element drawn from X . Similarly, for any distribution D, let x ← D denote a sample from D. For
an element x ∈ X we write BitDecomp(x) for an arbitrarily chosen but canonical (depending only on the
implicit set X) binary representation of x. For any density function f on domain X , let Supp(f) denote the
support of f ; that is Supp(f) = {x ∈ X : f(x) > 0}.
For density functions f1, f2 over the same finite domain X , the Hellinger distance between f1 and f2 is
H2(f1, f2) = 1−
∑
x∈X
√
f1(x)f2(x).
The total variation distance between f1 and f2 is
‖f1 − f2‖TV =
1
2
∑
x∈X
|f1(x) − f2(x)| ≤
√
2H2(f1, f2).
The following lemma relates the Hellinger distance and the trace distance of superpositions.
Lemma 2.0.1. Let X be a finite set and f1, f2 two density functions on X. Let
|ψ1〉 =
∑
x∈X
√
f1(x) |x〉 , and |ψ2〉 =
∑
x∈X
√
f2(x) |x〉 .
Then
‖|ψ1〉 − |ψ2〉‖tr ≤
√
1− (1−H2(f1, f2))2.
2.2 Ideal Lattices
In this section, we present some background on ideal lattices, the truncated discrete Gaussian distribution
and the Ring Learning with Errors problem. For a positive integer B, modulus q, and dimension n, the
truncated discrete Gaussian distribution is a distribution with support
{
x ∈ Znq : ‖x‖ ≤ B
√
n
}
defined as
follows:
DZnq ,B(x) =
exp
(
−π‖x‖2/B2
)
∑
z∈Znq ,‖z‖≤B
√
n exp(−π|z|2/B2)
.
The Ring Learning with Errors (RLWE) assumption[LPR13] is parameterized by a ring R, modulus
q ∈ N and a noise distribution χ. Informally, the assumption states that given many samples of the form
(a, a · s+ e) where s is fixed for all samples, a is chosen uniformly at random and e is chosen from the error
distribution χ for each sample, it is hard to compute s. The formal definition is given below. Here, we
restrict ourselves to a special family of cyclotomic rings.
Assumption 1. Let n be a power of two, fn(X) = X
n + 1 an irreducible polynomial over Q[X ] and
Rn = Z[X ]/(fn(X)). Let q = {qn}n∈N be a family of moduli, Rn,qn = Rn/qnRn = Zqn [X ]/(fn(X)) the
quotient space, and χ = {χn}n∈N a family of error distributions, where χn is a distribution over Rn,qn . For
any secret s in Rn,qn , let Os denote the oracle that, on each query, chooses a← Rn,qn , e← χn and outputs
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(a, a · s+ e mod qn). The Ring Learning with Errors assumption RLWER,q,χ, parameterized by the family of
rings {Rn}n=2k,k∈N, moduli family q and distribution family χ, states that for any PPT adversary A, there
exists a negligible function negl(·) such that for all security parameters n = 2k, k ∈ N,
Pr
[
s← AOs()(1n) : s← Rn,qn
]
≤ negl(n).
Given many samples {ai, ai · s+ ei}i, one can efficiently find s using a trapdoor for the public elements
{ai}i. There exists a sampling algorithm that can sample {ai}i together with a trapdoor τ , and an inversion
algorithm that uses τ to extract s from the set of evaluations {ai · s+ ei}i. Without the trapdoor, the public
elements {ai}i look uniformly random.
Theorem 2.1 (Theorem 5.1 of [MP12] in the Ring setting). Let n,m, q be such that n is a power of 2,
m = Ω(log q). There is an efficient randomized algorithm GenTrap that takes as input (1n, 1m, q), and
returns a = (ai)i ∈ Rmn,q and a trapdoor τ such that the distribution of a is negligibly (in n) close to the
uniform distribution over Rmn,q. Moreover, there is an efficient algorithm Invert and a universal constant CT
such that the following holds with overwhelming probability over the choice of (a, τ)← GenTrap(1n, 1m, q):
for all s ∈ Rn,q, e such that ‖e‖ ≤ q
CT
√
n log q
, Invert(a, τ, a · s+ e) = s.
2.3 Noisy Trapdoor Claw-Free Hash Functions
In this section we introduce the notion of noisy trapdoor claw-free functions (NTCFs). Let X ,Y be finite
sets and K a set of keys. For each k ∈ K there should exist two (efficiently computable) injective functions
fk,0, fk,1 that map X to Y, together with a trapdoor tk that allows efficient inversion from (b, y) ∈ {0, 1}×Y
to f−1k,b (y) ∈ X ∪ {⊥}. For security, we require that for a randomly chosen key k, no polynomial time
adversary can efficiently compute x0, x1 ∈ X such that fk,0(x0) = fk,1(x1) (such a pair (x0, x1) is called a
claw).
Unfortunately, we do not know how to construct such ‘clean’ trapdoor claw-free functions. Hence, as in
previous works [BCM+18, Mah18], we will use ‘noisy’ version of the above notion. For each k ∈ K, there
exist two functions fk,0, fk,1 that map X to a distribution over Y.
The following definition is taken directly from [BCM+18].
Definition 2.1.1 (NTCF family). Let λ be a security parameter. Let X and Y be finite sets. Let KF be a
finite set of keys. A family of functions
F = {fk,b : X → DY}k∈KF ,b∈{0,1}
is called a noisy trapdoor claw free (NTCF) family if the following conditions hold:
1. Efficient Function Generation. There exists an efficient probabilistic algorithm GenF which gen-
erates a key k ∈ KF together with a trapdoor tk:
(k, tk)← GenF(1λ) .
2. Trapdoor Injective Pair.
(a) Trapdoor: There exists an efficient deterministic algorithm InvF such that with overwhelming
probability over the choice of (k, tk)← GenF(1λ), the following holds:
for all b ∈ {0, 1}, x ∈ X and y ∈ Supp(fk,b(x)), InvF(tk, b, y) = x.
(b) Injective pair: For all keys k ∈ KF , there exists a perfect matching Rk ⊆ X × X such that
fk,0(x0) = fk,1(x1) if and only if (x0, x1) ∈ Rk.
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3. Efficient Range Superposition. For all keys k ∈ KF and b ∈ {0, 1} there exists a function f ′k,b :
X → DY such that the following hold.
(a) For all (x0, x1) ∈ Rk and y ∈ Supp(f ′k,b(xb)), InvF(tk, b, y) = xb and InvF (tk, b⊕ 1, y) = xb⊕1.
(b) There exists an efficient deterministic procedure ChkF that, on input k, b ∈ {0, 1}, x ∈ X and
y ∈ Y, returns 1 if y ∈ Supp(f ′k,b(x)) and 0 otherwise. Note that ChkF is not provided the
trapdoor tk.
(c) For every k and b ∈ {0, 1},
Ex←UX
[
H2(fk,b(x), f
′
k,b(x))
] ≤ 1/50 .5
Here H2 is the Hellinger distance. Moreover, there exists an efficient procedure SampF that on
input k and b ∈ {0, 1} prepares the state
1√
|X |
∑
x∈X ,y∈Y
√
(f ′k,b(x))(y) |x〉 |y〉 . (1)
4. Claw-Free Property. For any PPT adversary A, there exists a negligible function negl(·) such that
the following holds:
Pr
[
(x0, x1) ∈ Rk : (k, tk)← GenF (1λ), (x0, x1)← A(k)
] ≤ negl(λ)
3 Proof of Quantumness Protocol
We will now present our protocol. Throughout the protocol, we will ignore dependence on the security
parameter when clear from context. Let F be a NTCF family with domain X , range Y described by the
algorithms GenF , InvF ,ChkF ,SampF . Let w denote the length of bit decomposition of elements of X .
Finally, let H be a hash function that maps X to {0, 1}.
Proof of Quantumness Protocol
The protocol is parameterized by a hash function H : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} (which will be modeled as a random oracle in
the security proof).
1. The verifier generates (k, κ)← GenF (1
λ) and sends k to the prover.
2. The prover sends λ tuples {(yi,mi, di)}i∈[λ]. The verifier initializes count = 0 and performs the following
checks:
(a) It checks that all values in {yi}i are distinct.
(b) It computes xi,b = InvF (κ, b, yi) for each i ∈ [λ], b ∈ {0, 1}. Next, it checks ifmi = d
T
i ·(BitDecomp(xi,0)+
BitDecomp(xi,1)) +H(xi,0) +H(xi,1). If this check passes, it increments the value of count by 1.
3. If count > 0.75λ, the verifier outputs 1, else it outputs ⊥.
Protocol 1: Protocol for Proof of Quantumness
Theorem 3.1. Let F be a family of NTCF functions satisfying Definition 2.1.1. Then Protocol 1 satisfies
the following properties:
- Completeness: There exists a quantum polynomial-time prover P and a negligible function negl(·) such
that for all λ ∈ N and hash functions H, P succeeds in the protocol with probability at least 1−negl(λ).
5Here 1/50 can be replaced by an arbitrarily small constant.
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- Proof of Quantumness: For any PPT (classical) adversary A, there exists a negligible function negl(·)
such that for all λ ∈ N, A succeeds in the protocol with probability at most negl(λ) where H is modeled
as a random oracle.
3.1 Completeness
In this section, we show that the honest (quantum) prover is accepted by the verifier.
The honest prover receives NTCF key k. It does the following:
1. It starts with λ copies of the state |0〉 |0〉 |0〉 |−〉. For each i ∈ [λ], let |ψi〉 = |0〉 |0〉 |0〉 |−〉. It then
applies SampF to the first three registers of |ψi〉 for each i, resulting in the state
∣∣∣ψ′(1)i
〉
, where
∣∣∣ψ′(1)1
〉
=

 1√
2|X |
∑
x∈X ,y∈Y,b∈{0,1}
√
(f ′k,b(x))(y) |b〉 |x〉 |y〉

 |−〉 . (2)
This quantum state is at distance at most 0.2 from the following quantum state:
∣∣∣ψ(1)i
〉
=

 1√
2|X |
∑
x∈X ,y∈Y,b∈{0,1}
√
(fk,b(x))(y) |b〉 |x〉 |y〉

 |−〉 . (3)
2. Next, it measures the third register, obtaining measurement y ∈ Y. Let x0, x1 ∈ X be the unique
elements such that y is in the support of fk,b(xb). Applying this operation to the state in (3), the
resulting state (ignoring the measured register) is∣∣∣ψ(2)i
〉
=
(
1√
2
(|0〉 |x0〉+ |1〉 |x1〉)
)
|−〉 . (4)
3. Let UH be a unitary that maps |a〉 |b〉 to |a〉 |b+H(a)〉. The prover applies UH to the second and third
register. On applying this operation to the state in (4), the new state is
∣∣∣ψ(3)i
〉
=
1
2

∑
b,b′
(−1)b′ |b〉 |xb〉 |b′ +H(xb)〉

 . (5)
4. The prover then evaluates the function BitDecomp on the second register. Applying this to (5), the
resulting state is ∣∣∣ψ(4)i
〉
=
1
2

∑
b,b′
(−1)b′ |b〉 |BitDecomp(xb)〉 |b′ +H(xb)〉

 . (6)
5. Finally, the prover applies the Hadamard operator to all registers. On applying this to (6), this
produces the state (where hb = H(xb) and xb = BitDecomp(xb))∣∣∣ψ(5)i
〉
=
1√
2w+4
∑
b,b′∈{0,1}
∑
m,m′∈{0,1},
d∈{0,1}w
(−1)m·b+dT ·xb+m′·b′+m′·hb+b′ |m〉 |d〉 |m′〉
=
1√
2w+2
∑
m∈{0,1},d∈{0,1}w
|m〉 |d〉 |1〉
(
(−1)dT ·x0+h0 + (−1)m+dT ·x1+h1
)
(7)
Upon measurement of the state in (7), the output tuple (m, d, 1) satisfies m = dT · (x0 + x1) + h0 + h1
(with probability 1). As a result, applying the above operations to
∣∣∣ψ′(1)i
〉
results in a tuple (y,m, d)
that is accepted with probability at least 0.8. Using a Chernoff bound it is straightforward to argue
that there exists a negligible function negl(·) such that with probability at least 1 − negl(λ), at least
3/4 fraction of the tuples in {(yi,mi, di)} pass the verification.
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3.2 Proof of Quantumness : Classical Prover’s Advantage in the Random Or-
acle Model
Here, we will show that if the function H is replaced with a random oracle, then any classical algorithm that
has non-negligble advantage in Protocol 1 can be used to break the claw-free property of F . Consider the
following security experiment which captures the interaction between a (classical) prover and a challenger in
the random oracle model; the challenger represents the verifier in the protocol.
Experiment 1 In this experiment, the challenger represents the verifier in Protocol 1 and also responds
to the random oracle queries issued by the prover.
1. The challenger (verifier) chooses an NTCF key (k, κ) ← GenF (1λ) and sends k to the prover. The
prover and challenger have access to a random oracle H : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}.
2. The prover sends {(yi,mi, di)}i∈[λ]. For each i ∈ [λ], the challenger computes xi,b ← InvF(κ, b, yi) for
b ∈ {0, 1}, queries the random oracle H on xi,0, xi,1 and receives hi,0, hi,1 respectively. Next, it checks
if mi = d
T
i · (BitDecomp(xi,0)+BitDecomp(xi,1))+hi,0+hi,1. If at least 0.75λ tuples satisfy the check,
it outputs 1, else it outputs ⊥.
Experiment 2 This experiment is similar to the previous one, except that the challenger implements the
random oracle, and does not use the trapdoor for performing the final λ checks.
1. The challenger (verifier) chooses an NTCF key (k, κ) ← GenF (1λ) and sends k to the prover. The
challenger also implements the random oracle as follows. It maintains a database which is initially
empty. On receiving a query x, it checks if there exists a tuple (x, h) in the database. If so, it outputs
h, else it chooses a random bit h← {0, 1}, adds (x, h) to the database and outputs h.
2. The prover sends {(yi,mi, di)}i∈[λ]. On receiving this set from the prover, the challenger does not
compute the inverses of yi. Instead, it initializes count = 0, and for each i, it looks for tuples (xi,0, hi,0)
and (xi,1, hi,1) in the table such that ChkF (yi, 0, xi,0) = ChkF(yi, 1, xi,1) = 1. If such (xi,0, xi,1) do
not exist, then the challenger chooses a random bit ri and sets count = count + ri. Else, it checks if
mi = d
T
i · (BitDecomp(xi,0) + BitDecomp(xi,1)) + hi,0 + hi,1. If so, it increments count.
Finally, it checks if count > 0.75λ. If so, it outputs 1, else outputs ⊥.
Experiment 3 This experiment is identical to the previous one, except that the challenger, after receiving
{(yi,mi, di)}i, outputs ⊥ if for all i ∈ [λ], there does not exist two entries (xi,0, hi,0), (xi,1, hi,1) in the
database such that ChkF (yi, 0, xi,0) = ChkF(yi, 1, xi,1) = 1.
Analysis : For any classical PPT prover A, let pA denote the probability that the verifier outputs 1 in
Protocol 1 (when H is replaced with a random oracle), and for w ∈ {1, 2, 3}, let pA,w denote the probability
that the challenger interacting with A in Experiment w outputs 1. From the definition of Experiment 1 it
follows that pA = pA,1.
Claim 3.1.1. For any prover A, pA,1 = pA,2.
Proof. The main differences between Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 are that the challenger implements
the random oracle, and secondly, after receiving {(yi,mi, di)}i, the challenger does not use the trapdoor for
checking. Note that in Experiment 1, if either xi,0 or xi,1 are not queried to the random oracle H , then
H(xi,0) + H(xi,1) is a uniformly random bit. Moreover, since the yi values are distinct, if there exist two
indices i, j such that both the preimages of yi and yj are not queried, then H(xi,0) +H(xi,1) is independent
of H(xj,0) +H(xj,1). As a result, for each index i such that the preimages of yi are not queried, the value
of count is incremented with probability 1/2.
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In Experiment 2, the challenger checks for pairs corresponding to xi,0 and xi,1 in the database, and if either
of them is missing, it increments count with probability 1/2. As a result, the probability of count > 0.75λ is
identical in both experiments.
Claim 3.1.2. There exists a negligible function negl(·) such that for any prover A and any security parameter
λ ∈ N, pA,2 ≤ pA,3 + negl(λ).
Proof. The only difference between these two experiments is that the challenger, at the end of the experiment,
outputs ⊥ if for all i ∈ [λ], either xi,0 or xi,1 has not been queried to the random oracle. The only case
in which the challenger outputs 1 in Experiment 2 but outputs ⊥ in Experiment 3 is when for all i ∈ [λ],
either xi,0 or xi,1 has not been queried, but there exist t ≥ 0.75λ indices {i1, . . . , it} such that count was
incremented. Using Chernoff bounds, we can show that this happens with negligible probability.
Claim 3.1.3. Assuming F is a secure claw-free trapdoor family, for any PPT prover A, there exists a
negligible function negl(·) such that for all λ ∈ N, pA,3(λ) ≤ negl(λ).
Proof. Suppose there exists a PPT prover A and a non-negligible function ǫ(·) such that for all λ ∈ N,
the challenger outputs 1 with probability ǫ = ǫ(λ) in Experiment 3. This means with probability at least
ǫ, there exists an index i∗ ∈ [λ] such that A queries the random oracle on xi∗,0, xi∗,1 and finally outputs
{(yi,mi, di)}i such that ChkF(yi∗ , 0, xi∗,0) = ChkF (yi∗ , 1, xi∗,1) = 1.
We will construct a reduction algorithm B that breaks the claw-free property of F with probability
ǫ. The reduction algorithm receives the key k from the NTCF challenger, which it forwards to A. Next,
A makes polynomially many random oracle queries, which are answered by the reduction algorithm by
maintaining a database. Eventually, A sends {(yi,mi, di)}. The reduction algorithm checks if there exist
tuples (xi∗,0, hi∗,0) and (xi∗,1, hi∗,1) in its database such that ChkF (yi∗ , 0, xi∗,0) = ChkF(yi∗ , 1, xi∗,1) = 1.
If so, it sends (xi∗,0, xi∗,1) to the NTCF challenger.
Using the above claims, it follows for every classical prover A, there exists a negligible function negl(·)
such that for all λ ∈ N, pA ≤ negl(λ).
4 Construction of NTCFs based on Ring LWE
Our construction is similar to the one in [BCM+18]. Let λ be the security parameter, n = 2⌈log λ⌉. The
following are other parameters chosen by our scheme (we will ignore dependence on security parameter/n):
• Ring R = Z[X ]/(Xn + 1).
• Modulus q = poly(n), Rq = R/qR
• m = Ω(log q) : determines the dimension of range space
• χ: the noise distribution. In our case, χ is a Discrete Gaussian over Zn with parameter BV .
• BP : the noise bound for function evaluation. We require the following constraints on BP :
– BP ≥ Ω(n ·m ·BV )
– 2BP
√
n ·m ≤ q/(CT ·
√
n log q) for some constant CT
The domain is X = Rq, and range is Y = Rmq .
Each function key k = (a, a · s + e), where s ∈ Rq, ai, ei ∈ Rq for all i ∈ [m], a = [a1 . . . am]T ,
e = [e1 . . . em]
T . For b ∈ {0, 1}, x ∈ X , k = (a, a · s+ e), the density function fk,b(x) is defined as follows:
∀y ∈ Y, (fk,b(x))(y) = DZn·m,BP (y − a · x− b · a · s), (8)
where y = [y1 . . . ym]
T , and each yi can be represented as an element in Z
n
q (using the coefficient represen-
tation); similarly for a · x and a · s.
We will now show that each of the properties of NTCFs hold.
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1. Efficient Key Generation: The key generation algorithmGenF(1λ) first chooses (a, τ)← GenTrap(1n, 1m, q),
s← Rq and e← χm. It outputs key k = (a, a · s+ e), and the trapdoor is κ = (τ, k, s).
2. Trapdoor Injective Pair:
(a) Trapdoor : For k = (a, a · s+ e), x ∈ X and b ∈ {0, 1}, the support of fk,b(x) is
Supp(fk,b(x)) =
{
y ∈ Y : ‖y − a · x− b · a · s‖ ≤ BP
√
n ·m}
The inversion algorithm InvF takes as input the lattice trapdoor τ , b ∈ {0, 1}, y ∈ Y and outputs
Invert(τ, a,y) − b · s. From Theorem 2.1, it follows that with overwhelming probability over
the choice of a, for all y ∈ Supp(fk,b(x)), Invert(τ, a,y) = x + b · s. Hence, it follows that
InvF(κ, b,y) = x.
(b) Injective Pair : Let k = (a, a · s+ e). From the construction, it follows that fk,0(x0) = fk,1(x1) if
and only if x1 = x0 + s. Hence the set Rk = {(x, x + s) : x ∈ X}.
3. Efficient Range Superposition: The function f ′k,0 is same as fk,0, while f
′
k,1 is defined as follows
(recall k = (a, a · s+ e)):
∀y ∈ Y, (f ′k,1(x))(y) = DZn·m,BP (y − a · x− (a · s+ e)) (9)
(a) Since f ′k,0 = fk,0, it follows that for all (x0, x1) ∈ Rk and y ∈ Supp(f ′k,0(x0)), InvF(κ, 0,y) = x0
and InvF(κ, 1,y) = x1. We need to show the same for f ′k,1; that is, for all (x0, x1) ∈ Rk and
y ∈ Supp(f ′k,1(x1)), InvF (κ, 1,y) = x1 and InvF (κ, 0,y) = x0. For all x ∈ X ,
Supp(f ′k,1(x)) =
{
y ∈ Y : ‖y − a · x− a · s− e‖ ≤ BP
√
n ·m}
Hence for any y ∈ Supp(f ′k,1(x)), ‖y − a · x1 − a · s‖ ≤ 2BP
√
n ·m; using Theorem 2.1, we can
conclude that InvF(κ, 1,y) = x1.
(b) The procedureChkF takes as input y ∈ Y, k = (a,v), b ∈ {0, 1}, x ∈ X and checks if ‖y − a · x− b · v‖ ≤
BP
√
n ·m.
(c) The definition of SampF is identical to the one in [BCM+18], and the Hellinger distance can be
bounded by 1− e−
2pim·n·BV
BP .From our setting of parameters, this quantity is at most 1/50.
4. Claw-Free Property Suppose there exists an adversary A that, on input k = (a, a ·s+e) can output
(x0, x1) ∈ Rk. Then this adversary can be used to break the Ring LWE assumption, since x1−x0 = s.
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